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ESSAY
On the Expressive Functions of Family
Law
Carol Weisbrod*
The changing role of the family in the law is captured in the headline of
a New York Times article published in September, 1988: "Family Law:
Battle Ground in Social Revolution." Family law is an arena in which
issues of law and medicine, law and technology, and law and morals,
are being discussed. The field is understood as being centrally important
to our common situation. Along with this comes a renewed emphasis on
the use of law to shape that situation.'
INTRODUCTION
This Essay concerns the suggestion that expressive or symbolic as-
pects of law should be used in the field of family law to guide people to
better behavior.
We are reminded of this ancient theme by Professor Mary Ann
Glendon's Abortion and Divorce in Western Law.2 Professor Glendon's
argument, in part, is that law has both strong educational functions and
significant expressive components. Law is a play, a story, a message, a
thing that is shaped by the culture and in turn shapes the culture. To
* Professor of Law, Law School, University of Connecticut. All rights reserved.
Students in my Family Law class (Fall 1988) provided some of the illustrative mate-
rial used here. I thank them for their contributions.
See Greenhouse, Family Law: Battle Ground in Social Revolution, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 2, 1988, at B6, col. 3. In that article, Linda Greenhouse wrote that "Family law,
long a professional backwater, has become a new constitutional battle ground on which
the social revolutions in family structure, child bearing and personal relationships are
being fought." Id.
2 M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
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the extent law shapes culture we should use it to send messages.'
Stronger versions of the desirability of a message in family law have
also been offered. Professor Jan Gorecki writes,
Those who are unilaterally guilty of disrupting their marriages ... should
be punished . . . . Their punishment conveys a message to the general
society: minimum of responsibility is anyone's family obligation, and so is
an effort to avoid inflicting suffering on one's spouse and children, and
wrecking their lives. This message, if properly conveyed in the process of
instrumental learning, may not but influence general attitudes, and may
eventually bring about . . . decline of the total sum of suffering and de-
crease of the broader social problems generated by widespread family
disintegration.4
The message that Professor Gorecki envisions is a message to virtue.
The message may be enforced if necessary as punishment, as in crimi-
nal law.5 Professor Glendon sees the messages of law in various ways,
sometimes the direct communication of a position - as when she
speaks of the present message of no-fault-no-responsibility divorce6 -
and sometimes a message in the form of a compromise or a conversa-
tion, in which the law contains (or should contain) the voices of differ-
ent parts of the cultural discussion.
Commentators may concede the uncertainties of the law/behavior in-
teraction. Professor Glendon says, "No one can chart with confidence
the ways in which law, customs, new lines of behavior, ideas about law,
3 Law, Professor Glendon notes, is "constitutive when legal language begins . . . to
influence the manner in which we perceive reality." Id. at 9. We must therefore be
"attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible" in the stories we tell. Id. at 142.
4 Gorecki, Moral Premises of Contemporary Divorce Laws: Western and Eastern
Europe and the United States, in MARRIAGE & COHABITATION IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETIES 124, 129 (J. Eekelaar & S. Katz eds. 1980) [hereafter Gorecki, Moral
Premises]; see also Gorecki, Divorce in Poland - A Socio-Legal Study, in SOCIOLOGY
OF LAW (V. Aubert ed. 1972) (discussing, inter alia, moral and pedagogical purposes
of the rule of recrimination).
I Professor Gorecki argues for retention of the idea of recrimination: "In its nar-
rower version, the principle prevents the solely guilty spouse from claiming divorce. In
its broader, classical version, it also prevents a spouse from claiming divorce if both he
and his counterpart are guilty of matrimonial offenses." Gorecki, Moral Premises,
supra note 4, at 126. "The principle of recrimination provides the harmed spouse with
an opportunity to receive compensation by use of the threat of vetoing divorce." Id. at
128.
6 Thus Professor Glendon is concerned not with the absence of a message, but with
its content. For example, the law of property settlements in divorce may teach that one
can walk away from a spouse (if not children) without assuming financial responsibil-
ity. See M. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 78 passim ("no-fault, no responsibility
divorce").
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and ideas about morality reciprocally influence each other."' 7 One prob-
lem is that "only the most elementary legal information reaches the
public, and this almost always ina slightly inaccurate form."8 Professor
Glendon concludes that while there may be problems of communica-
tion, "there is no escape from the fact that, willy-nilly, law performs a
pedagogical role. It contributes in a modest but not a trivial way to that
framework of beliefs and feelings within which even our notions of self-
interest are conceived." 9
Recognition of law as expressive, as a source of symbols and values,
has been common in America for some time. 10 This is particularly true
in connection with the role of the Supreme Court, where the point is so
true that one must work to persuade the public that "constitutional"
7 Id. at 138. Professor Glendon's discussion of the law's pedagogic function uses
Plato's The Laws as a text. Id. at 5-9. Plato's treatment in The Laws assumes, how-
ever, an unchanging truth and virtue and the desirability of an unchanging legal
structure:
[An observer of] foreign customs must proceed [to the council] as soon as
he gets back. If he has come across people who were able to give him some
information about any problems of legislation or teaching or education, or
if he actually comes back with some discoveries of his own, he should
make his report to a full meeting of the council. If he seems to be not a
whit better or worse for his journey, he should be congratulated at any
rate for his energy; if he is thought to have become appreciably better,
even higher recognition should be given him during his lifetime, and after
his death he must be paid appropriate honours by authority of the assem-
bled council. But if it seems that he has returned corrupted, this self-styled
'expert' must talk to no one, young or old, and provided he obeys the
authorities he may live as a private person; but if not, and
105. he is convicted in court of meddling in some educational or legal
question,
he must die.
106. If none of the authorities takes him to court when that is what he
deserves,
it should count as a black mark against them when distinctions are
awarded.
PLATO, THE LAWS 503 (T. Saunders trans. 1978). In such a world, no serious prob-
lem about the pedagogic preambles or the content of the laws themselves exists. See,
e.g., A. MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 55-56 (1966). However, this is
not our world. See M. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 139.
8 M. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 138-39. Professor Glendon cites in this connection
Michael Kammen's The Machine That Would Go of Itsef. The Constitution in Ameri-
can Culture, for examples of misinformation regarding the American constitution. Id.
at 189 n.78.
9 Id. at 139.
" "'Law' is primarily a great reservoir of emotionally important social symbols." T.
ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34 (1962).
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does not necessarily mean good or wise. This emphasis on expressive
functions (linked somehow to instrumental values)" has been given new
vitality by work in several fields. 12
Initially, in thinking about this issue we might separate two ideas.
First, we look at law because law does in fact express values, and thus
teaches. We should know as much as we can about what law teaches as
a descriptive matter, despite the complex and contradictory substance of
the teaching. It is part of knowing the culture in which we live. Second,
we look at law because law can and ought to be used to teach specific
things. In brief, the expressive functions of law can and should be used
instrumentally. Professor Gorecki quotes Brandeis: "no small part of
the law's function is to make men good."'13 Atiyah, describing this as-
pect of law, referred to the "hortatory" function.' 4
The first position can accommodate, though it does not require, ideas
of uncertainty, indeterminacy and even chaos in law. The second idea
works best when we assume that in talking about law we deal with a
thing that can be known accurately, at least in theory. Clear messages
can be sent and received, even when they are complex.' 5 This assump-
11 Professor Glendon suggests, for example, that a change in the message of the law
on abortion might effect how we think about and deal with neonatal issues. See M.
GLENDON, supra note 2, at 61. For a discussion of the expression in law of competing
values, see infra note 15.
12 For an example of the law's contribution, see M. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERI-
CAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS 42-45 (1981)
(discussing legal trials and morality plays).
13 Gorecki, Moral Premises, supra note 4, at 128. Professor Gorecki suggests that a
prime function of law is society's moral education, particularly family and criminal
law. Id. Another view sees family law increasingly through the optic of contracts. See,
e.g., J. EEKELAAR, FAMILY LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 32-33 (2d ed. 1984) (critiquing
Gorecki's position, particularly on the law/society issue).
14 Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1272 (1980)
(questioning whether we have unduly neglected this function).
15 The complexity of legal messages is not necessarily a problem for those interested
in the expressive function. Indeed, on some versions, a tension in the message, or a
contradictory message, is viewed as a compromise between conflicting positions, or as a
way of incorporating aspects of the public debate. Thus, Professor Glendon writes:
"The 1976 West German divorce law ... added to the Civil Code section on the effects
of marriage the following sentence: 'Marriage is concluded for a lifetime.' " M.
GLENDON, supra note 2, at 109. From one point of view, she indicates,
[Tlhis insertion, part of a last-minute compromise between the coalition
government and the Christian Democrats, is strikingly out of place in a
divorce statute, just another sop to the losers. Yet ... it acknowledges an
important ideal of a large segment of the population, while accommodat-
ing to some extent in practice those who do not share or cannot live up to
the ideal.
Expressive Functions of Family Law
tion raises the problems reviewed here.
I. MESSAGES SENT
We might compare this idea of a clear legal message with some other
ideas about law in general. Thus Robert Gordon points out that "His-
tory helps to teach us that the rule of law 'system' is fundamentally
misdescribed, that inspected at close range, it's not really a system at
all, but a complex mess of competing and contradictory systems."' 6
Grant Gilmore comments that "When we think of our own or of any
other legal system, the beginning of wisdom lies in the recognition that
the body of the law, at any time or place, is an unstable mass in preca-
rious equilibrium.' 7 Gilmore's comments are particularly striking as
coming from a scholar who spent his professional life working in fields
- contracts and commercial law - in which formalism and theory
were dominant ideas and certainty a prime legal value. If these legal
contexts could produce and illustrate Gilmore's view, we would expect
that this sense of instability and uncertainty would pervade the area of
family law where the need for individualization is taken for granted.
Indeed, these descriptions of law in general have their analogues in
work on family law. Thus, Carl Schneider describes the complexity of
the sources of family law, the non-theoretical nature of family law
scholarship and the "rarity of attempts" in this field to "go beyond the
Id. On the same basis, Max Rheinstein viewed the fault-system as a compromise. Id. at
66 (discussing Rheinstein); M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE AND
THE LAW 254 (1972) ("With advancing age I have come not only to accept but to
admire the compromise.").
Attempts to make abortion illegal remind us of Prohibition, both because the pros-
pect of large-scale refusal to comply is so real, and because the symbolic victory (inde-
pendent of enforcement) may be sufficiently important for those opposed to abortion
that they will risk substantial non-compliance. On the symbolism of prohibition, see J.
GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE (2d ed. 1986). Professor Glendon illustrates a compro-
mise with the French abortion law. See M. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 15 (requiring
some undefined "distress" on the part of the woman). But, to consider France only,
how successful has that compromise really been? See N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1988, at 1,
col. 1 (recounting controversy over abortion pill). On the point that complexity may
seem incapacitating, see Minow, Supreme Court Forward: Justice Engendered, 101
HARv. L. REV. 82 (1987).
16 Gordon, Exchange on Critical Legal Studies, 6 LAW & HIST. 178, 181 (1988)
("The existing order, like past orders, is a teeming jungle of plural, contradictory, or-
ders, struggling for recognition and dominance.").
17 G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110 (1977); see also Peters, Grant
Gilmore and the Illusion of Certainty, 92 YALE L.J. 8 (1982) (Gilmore's commitment
to the idea that certainty is an illusion evidenced by his writing in commercial law).
1989]
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specific."' 8 He writes: "It is hard to produce a systematic view of an
unsystematic subject, and perhaps family law must always be ad hoc,
responsive to local conditions, sensitive to the day's sensibilities, and
willing to compromise irreconcilable differences." '1 9 Judith Areen de-
scribes the relatively "undeveloped state of secular thinking about fam-
ily life," with particular application to surrogacy questions.20 Martha
Minow discusses the Supreme Court decisions in relation to group con-
flict, suggesting that the Supreme Court has used debates about family,
state and individual to mediate larger social struggles. Thus, "it should
not be surprising that constitutional rhetoric about the family is con-
fused and inconsistent."'"
When we look at the things which law is - things we might legiti-
mately look at in determining a message - we see constitutions, legis-
lation, judicial opinions, official behavior of all sorts. All contribute to
the "symbolism" of law or the message that law sends out. This mes-
sage or symbolism will necessarily not be uniform or consistent since
law carries many values. All of this is true in all areas of law, but
particularly in family law which is inevitably focused on individuals,
and using open standards. It is not merely, as Tennyson had it, that
law is a "wilderness of single instances."2 2 It is that each single instance
can be said to stand for different things.23 The point is familiar in gen-
eral. The leading example is probably Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion,24 in which the holding and rhetoric were so far apart that dissent-
ing Justice Jackson invoked the precedent of Byron's Julia, who
IS See Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in Ameri-
can Family Law, 18 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 1039, 1041 (1985). His point, in part, is that
family law has never achieved the appearance of a system of connected doctrines. Id. at
1045-47. His discussion is a call for theory, with an outline of the problems involved.
Id. at 1041.
19 Id. at 1048.
20 Areen, Baby M Reconsidered, 76 GEO. L.J. 1941, 1942 (1988) ("We have never
really decided, for example, what obligations a parent owes to a child, when the law
should intervene to enforce those obligations, and whether enforcement should be ac-
complished by punishing the parent or by removing the child.").
Surrogacy, of course, exists. Cloning does not seem far behind. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Feb. 17, 1988, at 1, col. 3 (cloning of cows).
21 Minow, We, the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Families, 74 J.
AM. HIST. 959, 978 (1987).
22 A. TENNYSON, Aylmer's Field, in THE WORKS OF ALFRED LORD TENNYSON 146
(1903).
23 Which is what the techniques (as against the principle) of precedent are finally
about.
24 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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"whispering 'I will ne'er consent,' - consented. '2
In the area of family law, we might consider the messages sent by a
single text, Marvin v. Marvin.26 First, the opinion recites the facts of
cohabitation as if they matter to the legal system, thus reinforcing the
idea that law's function is principally to be responsive to social facts.2 7
Then the court opts for a kind of responsibility, by generally recogniz-
ing the enforceability of cohabitation contracts, as long as the explicit
consideration is something other than meretricious sexual services. The
last point is a signal in the direction of traditional moral values and the
existing case law.28 Finally, the court, having gone a long way toward
recognizing quasi or alternate29 marriage, speaks eloquently about
marriage:
The mores of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to
cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral
considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by so many.
Lest we be misunderstood, however, we take this occasion to point out that
the structure of society itself largely depends on the institution of mar-
riage, and nothing we have said in this opinion should be taken to dero-
gate from that institution. The joining of the man and woman in marriage
is at once the most socially productive and individually fulfilling relation-
ship that one can enjoy in the course of a lifetime3 °
Considered as a teaching tool, the Marvin opinion can be used for
many lessons or it can be used for one: expansion of rights of cohabi-
25 Id. at 19. For another example, see Zapeda v. Zapeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 262,
190 N.E.2d 849, 859 (1963) (holding that wrongful life is a tort but presenting no
remedy).
26 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
2 "During the past 15 years, there has been a substantial increase in the number of
couples living together without marrying." Id. at 665, 557 P.2d at 109, 134 Cal. Rptr.
at 818.
28 See In re Greene, 45 F.2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); see also RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 comment a, illustration 3, (1981) ("A has immoral relations
with B, a woman not his wife, to her injury. A's subsequent promise to reimburse B for
her loss is not binding under this Section.").
21 However, it did not resurrect common-law marriage.
30 Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. Thus, in
Leonard Bernstein's Candide, we have the following response by Pangloss to the ques-
tion: If marriage is so wonderful, why is there so much divorce? "Why marriage, boy,
is such a joy, so lovely a condition, that many ask no better than, to wed as often as
they can, in happy repetition. (Best of all possible worlds)." L. BERNSTEIN, CANDIDE
7-8 (1957) (book by Lillian Hellman, lyrics by Richard Wilbur, with additional lyrics
by John Latouche and Dorothy Parker). I would like to thank Richard Warren, Cura-
tor, Yale Collection of Historical Sound Recordings at Yale University Library, for his
assistance with this reference.
1989]
University of California, Davis
tants. The Marvin case, or any case, can be reduced to a proposition or
a statement of law, or a holding, or a finite point of view on a problem.
However, this approach (which the formal system, integrating its vari-
ous structural parts and its majority and dissenting opinions, makes
possible) is not the approach which those interested in expressive or
symbolic functions would take. Even if one did this, the central ques-
tion of message would remain. Is "expansion of the rights of cohabi-
tants" a symbolic move away from the values of responsibility and co-
hesion associated with marriage, or a symbolic move towards those
values now associated with nonmarital associations? 31
The problem of "what is the law" is behind one of the criticisms of a
well-known 1958 study comparing law and community moral stan-
dards on a number of family law issues.32 As a number of reviewers
31 And with Marvin, would we here cite cases expanding the rights of illegitimate
children? For a discussion of the "confusion and vacillation" of Supreme Court deci-
sions in this area, see H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 155 (2d ed. 1988).
32 J. COHEN, R. ROBSON & A. BATES, PARENTAL AUTHORITY: THE COMMUNITY
AND THE LAW (1958) [hereafter PARENTAL AUTHORITY]. This book attempted to
compare the public's moral sense of a problem's correct answer with a projected legal
answer. See generally L. FRIEDMAN & S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 596-610 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing material on the Parental Authority study).
On some problems, the study did not distinguish between general principles and
details. Thus, on issues relating to the legal age of marriage and the problem of paren-
tal consent, it was noted that on "neither of these issues did the disagreement found
relate to the principle involved. It related, instead, only to the ages at which marriage
should be legally possible, and consent unnecessary." Cooperrider, Book Review, 57
MICH. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1959) (reviewing PARENTAL AUTHORITY). Kalven makes
the same point in his review of Parental Authority. See Kalven, Book Review, 14
RUTGERS L. REV. 843, 846 (1960).
"Law" was used in the study to mean "the choices that the courts in the jurisdiction
probably would have made - by virtue of existing statutes, precedents or analogies -
if the specific situations were presented to them in litigious form." PARENTAL Au-
THORITY, supra, at 14. They are not, the authors say, the "law-in-action," rather "law
ready to be applied if and when the occasion calls." Id. A definition published in an
earlier account of the project was " 'Law': Choices that have been made by the courts
(in opinions) and the legislature (in. statutes) when actually confronted with such or
similar situations." Cohen, Robson & Bates, Ascertaining the Moral Sense of the Com-
munity: A Preliminary Report in an Experiment in Interdisciplinary Research, 8 J.
OF LEGAL EDUC. 137, 143 (1955). When were the choices made? How similar is simi-
lar? The study was not focused on knowledge of law, but rather on the discrepancy
between the law and the moral sense of the community. It indirectly relates, however,
to knowledge of law problems to the extent that we are, in effect, talking both about the
authors' knowledge of law, and the respondents' knowledge of law to the extent that
they were ignorant of the legal consequences of their answers. "[lilt is apparent that the
respondents had not the slightest awareness of the practical implications of their an-
[Vol. 22:991
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suggested, the treatment of law was static. The law was taken to mean
"law ready to be applied. ' 33 Said one reviewer, this seems to mean "an
application of statutes and judicial precedent without insight or
imagination. '34
The complexity of legal messages suggested here goes beyond what
might be viewed as an ordered dialogue or a deliberate attempt to in-
corporate many voices. The pluralism of law seems to be something
that is less planned, less obviously representative of the opinions of
identifiable groups. The pluralism of law may not even reflect what we
might see as judgments which are surely universal, easy cases. The law
of contracts continues to suggest, for example, that a man's feeling for
his bull is more important than his feeling for his son. 3
Assuming there is a law, or rule of law that can be known accurately
in principle, we confront the problem of whether it is known in fact. It
is suggested that law is known, though somewhat inaccurately, by the
public. Even Stanley Kowalski knows that Louisiana is under the
Napoleonic Code. 36 The point is made that the message sent is received,
but imperfectly.
swers." Cooperrider, supra, at 1123. The "Big Brother" approach involved in imple-
mentation, the review suggests, might, if surfaced, have revealed different attitudes. An-
other reviewer, concerned with the same sort of problem, suggests that "there is a risk
that [as to the problem of parents denying college or a career choice to their children]
that most respondents did not have a clear image of what legal intervention would
entail." Kalven, supra, at 846.
In 1975, the Cohen-Robson-Bates study was described as the "most extensive and
sophisticated study on the congruence of public sentiments and family law" then availa-
ble. Saunders, Collective Ignorance: Public Knowledge of Family Law, 24 FAM. CO-
ORDINATOR 69, 70 (1975).
33 Milner, Book Review, 21 U. PITT. L. REV. 147, 148 (1959) (quoting PARENTAL
AUTHORITY, supra note 32, at 14).
34 Id. at 147.
31 See G. GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT 59-85 (1974) (discussing Restatement of
Contracts); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89A illustrations 1, 6
(1981).
36 See T. WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE 42 (1947). Stanley Kowalski's
description of the Napoleonic Code in A Streetcar Named Desire involves an emphasis
on the community property aspects without a focus on the separate property possibili-
ties. Id. at 40. He says, "There is such a thing in the state of Louisiana as the
Napoleonic Code, according to which whatever belongs to my wife is also mine - and
vice versa." Id.
19891
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II. MESSAGES RECEIVED
What do we know about how law is understood?
One approach turns to empirical studies. That material itself is not
voluminous. 37 However, a general feeling exists that people do not
know much about the law or the legal system.3 One problem relates to
the sources of information about law. Newspapers and broadcast media
are listed as prime sources, with informal networks of friends and fam-
ily following. 39 Lawrence Friedman, reviewing Michael Kammen's
book on the Constitution, suggested that people learned what they
know from the six o'clock news.40 Information may be filtered through
individuals and groups in a way which is independently worth our
attention.41
Another response is impressionistic. Thus Thurman Arnold tells us
that: "The trader takes heart by learning that the law ignores the more
profitable forms of dishonesty in deference to the principle of individual
freedom from governmental restraint. The preacher, however, is glad to
learn that all forms of dishonesty which can be curbed without interfer-
ing with freedom or with economic law are being curbed. '42
Still impressionistically, another answer might go to other sources,
other understandings, and use those sources as material speaking to this
question. At the level of popular material, 43 journalism or detective fic-
tion,44 one finds understandings of the law which are not necessarily
17 For references on legal knowledge, see Cortese, A Study in Knowledge and Atti-
tudes Toward the Law: The Legal Knowledge Inventory, 3 ROCKY MTN. Soc. SCI. J.
192 (1966); Dwyer, Law Actual and Perceived: Sexual Politics of Law in Morocco, 13
LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 739 (1979); Greg, Popular Perceptions of Supreme Court Rul-
ings, 4 AM. POL. Q. 3 (1976); Williams & Hall, Knowledge of Law in Texas: Socio-
economic and Ethnic Differences, 7 LAW AND Soc'y REV. 99 (1972); Note, Legal
Knowledge of Michigan Citizens, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (1973).
38 See, e.g., Macaulay, Private Government, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
445 (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1987).
39 Saunders, supra note 32, at 72.
40 Friedman, Book Review, 6 LAW AND HIST. REV. 194, 195 (1988) (reviewing M.
KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERI-
CAN CULTURE (1986)).
41 Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change,
1983 Wis. L. REV. 789, 854 (discussing use of legal "horror stories"); see also
Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Pri-
vate Law in Action, 1984 WIs. L. REV. 443.
42 T. ARNOLD, supra note 10, at 35.
43 See generally Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 WIs. L.
REV. 527 (discussing popular culture's images of law and lawyers).
44 This piece is not, of course, an examination of even detective fiction as a source of
[Vol. 22:9911000
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those of Austinian jurisprudence. For example, in mystery stories, one
sometimes finds that multiple legal systems are understood as operating
in the world. Ed McBain's Blood Relatives tells of a woman wondering
whether sexual relations and marriage between cousins are forbidden
by the state or only by the church. 4 Arthur Upfield sees two systems,
aboriginal and western, tracking the same criminal. 46 Sometimes the
issue of the limits of state enforcement in relation to multiple systems of
authority is clear. Thus, Philip Mason's Call the Next Witness47 con-
tains a move and counter-move description of a murder trial (based on
a case in India in 1931) that centrally involves the relative power of
family groups and the Indian legal system. When it deals with the offi-
cial system, detective fiction may be far from sanguine about its opera-
tion. Thus Austin Freeman comments: "unspeakably dreary and de-
pressing were the brief proceedings that followed, and dreadfully
suggestive of the helplessness of even an innocent man on whom the
information about knowledge of law in the culture. At most, it suggests that some mate-
rial gives the impression that some ideas (multiple legal systems, limits of law) are
known. Any serious study which attempted to use fiction in this way would have to
take account of the point that one cannot take an inaccuracy (for example) as a neces-
sary indication of the author's actual knowledge, since one might be able to prove that
an author knew the law, and that the fiction nonetheless contained an inaccuracy. See
LaRou, The Portrayal of Law in Literature: Weisberg's Failure of the Word (Book
Review), 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 313 (reviewing R. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE
OF THE WORD (1984)). One would have to deal with the question of why that might
be so. Id. at 317. For discussion of a (sponsored) literature as a source of information
about government messages, see Dunham, The Uses of Stalinist Literary Debris, 32
SLAVIC REV. 115 (1973). There is a relation between at least some detective fiction and
popular culture as a whole. J.I.M. Stewart [Michael Innes] suggests that, for example,
"Holmes has even entered the mythology of the folk, so that if in a pub a man is called
'a ruddy Sherlock Holmes' the expression is ... generally understood ...." J. STEW-
ART, MYSELF AND MICHAEL INNES: A MEMOIR 180 (1987). Understood, as are refer-
ences to Shylock and Romeo, although "nobody has ever been called 'a peeping
Poirot.'" Id. Some law resonates. Do we know which?
For Holmes on solemnization and duress, see A. DOYLE, The Solitary Cyclist, in
THE RETURN OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 99-100 (1974).
45 E. McBAIN, BLOOD RELATIVES: AN 87TH PRECINCT MYSTERY 134 (1975) (dis-
tinguishing "real law" and "religious law"). A reference to "real" (official) as against
"religious" law can be read as meaning that the speaker knows something in addition
to "real" law. It can also be read as impacting on what "real" law is taken to mean.
46 See, e.g., A. UPFIELD, SINISTER STONES ch. 20 (1954) (same results but different
methods of Australian aborigines and modern Australian police).
41 P. WOODRUFF [P. Mason], CALL THE NEXT WITNESS (1945); see also Vrooman,
British Justice, and the Indian Mind (Book Review), N.Y. Times, March 10, 1946.
Mason was a member of the Indian Civil Service who was serving as a joint magistrate
when the episode on which the book is based occurred.
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law has laid its hand and in whose behalf its inexorable machinery has
been set in motion. '48 These points suggest the possibility of a general
knowledge not of legal rules or doctrines but of legal pluralism and the
limits of law in the culture.
One also suspects the possibility of vast ignorance of the role of law
in general going far beyond ignorance of specific rights or rules in the
legal system. Most obviously this may be true of children. Stephen
Wizner offered an anecdote relating to a nine-year-old child in a bur-
glary trial:
'Did we win or lose?'
'We won.'
'Yeah? What did we win?' 49
The child was told that "what he had 'won' was a decision that he
'didn't do it .. ' "50 The child answered - " 'but I didn't do it.' "I'
However, ignorance and misunderstanding may also characterize the
thinking of adults. Questions might be asked, not about knowledge of
rules in the state legal system, but about legal ideas more broadly. A
study of knowledge of law might well start with questions devoted to
the problem of marriage as a state-created relationship. For example,
do people know that two people must participate in an officially struc-
tured procedure? Hewitt v. Hewitt 2 involved two people who lived to-
gether from 1960 until 1975. In that case, the defendant "told her that
they were husband and wife and would live as such, no formal cere-
4 R. AUSTIN FREEMAN, THE RED THUMB MARK 89 (1986) (Reminiscent of the
gypsy curse: "May you be in a lawsuit in which you are in the right." VIKING BOOK
OF APHORISMS 210 (W. Auden & L. Kronenberger eds. 1962); cf Learned Hand's
view of litigation: "After now some dozen years of experience I must say that as a
litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and
death." Learned Hand, in Lectures on Legal Topics, 1921-22, Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, at 105 ("The deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the
Matter").
Some detective stories are filled with legal technicalities, for example, those of Cyril
Hare (Alfred Alexander Gordon Clarke) who was a barrister and then a County Court
Judge. See J. SYMONS, BLOODY MURDER 144 (1972). Those may initially reflect a
professional and not popular understanding of law.
49 Wizner, The Child and the State: Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 389, 389 (1972).
10 Id. at 399.
51 Id.; see also O'Barr & Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in
Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 661, 694 (1985) (reporting
different perceptions by magistrate and litigants of conversational agenda in small
claims courts).
52 77 Ill. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
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mony being necessary ..... "1 States of knowledge in this case may be
suggested as ranging from knowledge of common law marriage via lan-
guage in the present tense, to knowledge failing to include the idea that
both people have to do something to get married.5 4 Do people know
that they do not have to "ask" for a divorce?55 That "grounds" are
generally no longer necessary? Will it turn out that the law that people
"know" is the law of their childhood? How do people answer or think
they should answer the question "were you ever married" when their
marriages have been annulled?16
Some journalistic discussions of the family in America contain com-
ments about American family law that initially seem to be in the "igno-
rance" category. Thus, Barbara Ehrenreich, in The Hearts of Men,
writes: "Men cannot be forced to marry; once married, they cannot be
forced to bring home their paychecks, to be reliable jobholders, or of
course to remain married. '57 What is meant by the idea that people
cannot be forced to do something? Is this about a theory of sanctions, or
the limits on physical compulsion? Does she mean that American law
does not command men to marry? What is meant by the idea that men
do not have to - cannot be forced to - bring-home their paychecks?
Is there some underlying problem about the idea of the support obliga-
tion? Finally, while at the time Ehrenreich wrote people could not be
53 Id. at 53, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
54 So that a man might come home and say "I went downtown and got us married"
and be believed.
15 Did this, in any case, mean, ask a spouse to be a plaintiff in a divorce action, that
is, to participate in a particular kind of charade, on the one hand, and economic bar-
gaining, on the other?
56 Any relation here to people's answers and the void/voidable distinction? Do you
have to return wedding gifts? Will the answers here turn on ideas not of validity but of
vesting? Or equitable compensation? See A. BROOKNER, A FRIEND FROM ENGLAND
118 (1987) ("And did one return wedding presents in the case of annulment, or were
they just thrown in, as if the recipient probably needed or deserved some sort of conso-
lation prize?").
Some of these questions raise issues of the internal law of each family, (or each
individual) in the sense suggested by Leon Petrazycki [Petrazhitskii] in LAW AND MO-
RALITY: LEON PETRAZYCKI 68 (H. Babb trans. 1955) ("[E]ach family is a unique
legal world . . . ."). On this view, each family might, for example, have its own law of
divorce, existing inside the state law, and interacting with it, influenced by it, but also
perhaps shaping it. On Petrazycki, see J. GORECKI, SOCIOLOGY AND JURISPRUDENCE
OF LEON PETRAZYCKI (1975); see also Podgorecki, Unrecognized Father of Sociology
of Law: Leon Petrazycki, 15 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 184 (1980-1981).
17 B. EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN 11 (1983) ("[Clonsidering the absence of
legal coercion, the surprising thing is that men have for so long, and, on the whole, so
reliably, adhered to what we might call the 'breadwinner ethic.' ").
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forced to remain married, she presumably knew that the history of the
law of divorce is about the problem of forcing reluctant couples to re-
main married."8 Yet perhaps these comments by Ehrenreich can be best
understood not as a description of actual or possible legal rules, but as a
description of effective law or legal results in fact.5 9 It may be that
people know something about the practical limits of law,60 as much as
about the power and efficacy of law.
CONCLUSION
Family law is a particularly important point at which to examine
problems of the expressive function of law. It already contains many
examples of messages. 61 Proposals are heard to the effect that it should
18 Or even to cohabit. As to which, consider the interesting linkage in Matilda Jos-
lyn Gage's Women Church and State between American efforts to recapture runaway
wives and the English writ of restitution of conjugal rights, enforceable originally by
excommunication, then by contempt then, and after 1884, not at all. See M. GAGE,
WOMEN CHURCH AND STATE 390 (1893). For a discussion on the action, defenses, and
meaning of a breach of duty to cohabit, see P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 164 (3d ed.
1966). Note the parallel Scottish writ of adherence, which still exists but is unenforce-
able. See Clive, Marriage: An Unnecessary Legal Concept?, in MARRIAGE & COHABI-
TATION IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES, supra note 4, at 71 n.8; see also 3 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *94 (1899). A. HERBERT, UNCOMMON LAW 95-99 (1969)
(Marrowfat v. Marrowfat: "Is marriage legal"; action for restitution of conjugal
rights).
59 As to support, for example, Ehrenreich apparently does not think that the existing
laws really do create a support obligation, since they do not, as she says, compel the
purchase of life insurance policies. See B. EHRENREICH, supra note 57, at 146.
60 See Lewis, The Limits of Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1988, at 23, col. 1. The
point in general, is not new. See generally Pound, Limits of Effective Legal Action,
A.B.A. J. 55 (1917). On the efficacy of law, see Black, Paths to Desegregation, NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1957, at 11 ("[B]eyond all question, law does shape
attitude .... ").
61 Though there has been a change in the kind of message being sent over time. See
Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Pow-
ers and the Law, 65 IowA L. REV. 1249 (1980); Schneider, Moral Discourse and the
Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d
660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). Reynolds is a case in which instrumen-
tal and expressive functions work in the same direction. Marvin is a case in which they
diverge to some degree. The instrumental function of Reynolds, as has often been noted,
was not entirely fulfilled.
Truman said of Eisenhower in 1952: "He'll sit here, and he'll say, 'Do this! Do
that!' And nothing will happen. Poor Ike - it won't be a bit like the Army." C.
NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 9 (1960), quoted in T. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND
CONSEQUENCE 27 (1984); see also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 258
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contain more, despite the acknowledgement that the effectiveness of law
is limited. For example, Max Rheinstein concluded that law was not a
prime determinant of behavior in relation to marital stability.62 Mary
Ann Glendon notes that the relation between law and behavior are un-
certain, and that other factors are critical.63 Scholars whose concern is
law/society issues suggest that law may not be very important in caus-
ing particular behavior. 64
Even if we assume some effectiveness, the problem remains "what
message?" One possibility is a message of facilitation of private choice,
which may finally lead to the proposition that marriage is not a useful
legal idea.65 Another message would try to invoke the now-gone consen-
sus of the Christian nation. 66
(2d ed. 1986) ("[T]he Supreme Court is a court of last resort presumptively only.").
The point about law is not that nothing happens, but that things happen which we did
not expect (see M. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 106-07 for consequences of no-fault
divorce) and that the simple cause and effect relationship in which law shapes behavior
is far from proven. This does not make law trivial or insignificant. It does limit what
we can realistically expect law to do alone. Note in this connection Schneider's com-
ment that enforcement problems in family law are ubiquitous, even where the law
purports to act. See Schneider, supra note 18, at 1056. The difficulties in the child
custody area, for example, require no citation.
62 "Experienced observers have long known what we have laboriously tried in this
book to prove, namely, that a strict statute law of divorce is not an effective means to
prevent or even to reduce the incidence of marriage breakdown." M. RHEINSTEIN,
supra note 15, at 406. Abel suggests that this observation might have been a "founda-
tion for the study, not an afterthought ...." Abel, Law Books and Books About Law,
26 STAN. L. REV. 175, 183 (1973). "[Llegal professionals, with their strong and obvi-
ous commitment to the importance of law, are clearly the last people likely to accept its
irrelevance. Instead of doing so, they will make that irrelevance the central problem."
Id.
63 M. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 60. Again, her basic point concerns the impact
that law may have in the formation of ideas, attitudes and ultimately the social consen-
sus. Id. at 58-59.
See generally ;naterial on the impact of law on society in L. FRIEDMAN & S.
MACAULAY, supra note 32, at 197-492; see also Griffiths, Is Law Important?, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 339 (1979); Fineman, Illusive Equality: On Weitzman's Divorce
Revolution, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 781; Weitzman, Bringing the Law Back in,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 791.
65 Thus E.M. Clive raises the question of the future of the legal concept of marriage.
Clive, supra note 58, at 78. In the context of article 12 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (right to marry) he asks: "What are the underlying assumptions of that
provision? Would it be breached if a country abolished marriage as a legal concept but
gave its inhabitants complete freedom to participate in such religious or social marriage
ceremonies as they thought fit?" Id.
66 But that framework also had its anomalies. South Carolina had no divorce at all
for most of the 19th century, but had a statute regulating "[e]xcessive legacies to bas-
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The fact that the consensus is gone is a point on which we agree.
However, that agreement creates a problem, since we want our law of
the family to be not merely not evil, but affirmatively good.67 As Lee
Teitelbaum suggests,
It does not seem enough . . . to content ourselves with saying only that
some rule cannot be shown to produce evil. While that may suffice for a
commercial contract or the occasional tort, there is some feeling that fam-
ily relationships should be founded on rules and practices we can call
good.6
But what we can call "good," and how to justify the description, is
precisely the issue that remains unclear. "Like just about every other
long-standing institution," Clifford Geertz tells us, " - religion, art,
science, the state, the family - law is in the process of learning to
survive without the certitudes that launched it. ' ' 69 The process is associ-
ated in law with the realists and so we return to Grant Gilmore. He
wrote in 1951:
At twenty years distance we may with the prescience of hindsight pass
judgment. Llewellyn and his co-conspirators were right in everything they
said about the law. They skillfully led us into the swamp. Their mistake
was in being sure that they knew the way out of the swamp: they did not,
at least we are still there. 70
Decades later, it is as true in family law as in much else.71
tards or women living in adultery." See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-480 (repealed 1987).
67 Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse and Family Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 430, 439
(1985). See generally Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, DUKE L.J. (1979);
Kay, Moral Knowledge and Constitutional Adjudication, -- TUL. L. REV. --
(forthcoming).
6 Teitelbaum, supra note 67, at 439.
69 C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHRO-
POLOGY 217 (1983).
70 Gilmore, Book Review, 60 YALE L.J. 1251, 1252 (1951) (reviewing K. LLEWEL-
LYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1951)). Gilmore himself thought that in general law fol-
lowed society, so that a just society resulted in a just law. But, he wrote, "Law never
creates society; society creates Law. Law never makes society better; a better society
will improve the law." Gilmore, Anarchy and History, 14 U. CHI. L. SCH. REC. 7
(1966); see also G. GILMORE, supra note 17, at 111 ("In Heaven there will be no law.
... In Hell there will be nothing but law . . ").
For recent discussions of legal realism, see L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE,
1927-1960 (1986); Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book Review), 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465
(1988).
71 Just before his death Gilmore said:
We stand at the end of a half century during which the body of the law
has been at fives and threes - not to say, sixes and sevens. The imposing
structure of our nineteenth century law - and a magnificent creation it
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But there is something in family law that makes the matter pecu-
liarly difficult. The problem is centrally that we care so much, and that
law, finally, can do so little. As to this, it may be that the public is
more sensitive to reality than some lawyers. Here is Trollope, particu-
larly acute on the failure of the law to provide anything approaching
an adequate remedy in certain situations. In Kept in the Dark7 involv-
ing the concealment of a wife's previous engagement, the wife, rejected
by her husband, considers the law's relevance to her situation. The idea
of the "limits of law" could not be more clearly set out.
She could not force him to be her companion. The law would give her
only those things which she did not care to claim. He already offered more
than the law would exact, and she despised his generosity. As long as he
supported her the law could not bring him back and force him to give her
to eat of his own loaf, and to drink of his own cup .... He had said that
he had gone, and would not return, and the law could not bring him back
again.73
The strength of inquiries into the expressive functions of law is that
they focus not only on the formal content of the decision, but also on its
effect and tone. They direct attention away from the decision maker,
powerful and authoritative, and towards the audiences which the deci-
sion both addresses and reflects. While emphasis on rule and decision
making gets us to clarification and thus simplification, emphasis on
rhetoric gets us to complexity and contradiction. Given the circum-
stances, while we must somehow still decide things, we might do well
to announce our decisions in a less certain voice.
was - lies in ruins. It has not been rebuilt - nor will it be, although
there are a good many would-be master builders eager to offer their ser-
vices. If any of your instructors was rash enough to tell you what the law
is, you would not believe him; if you did, you would be poorly equipped to
operate in the real world.
Gilmore, What is a Law School, 15 CONN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1982).
72 A. TROLLOPE, KEPT IN THE DARK (1882, republished 1978).
13 Id. at 50.
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